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Storytelling is a human universal. From gathering around the camp-ﬁre telling tales of
ancestors to watching the latest television box-set, humans are inveterate producers and
consumers of stories. Despite its ubiquity, little attention has been given to understanding the
function and evolution of storytelling. Here we explore the impact of storytelling on hunter-
gatherer cooperative behaviour and the individual-level ﬁtness beneﬁts to being a skilled
storyteller. Stories told by the Agta, a Filipino hunter-gatherer population, convey messages
relevant to coordinating behaviour in a foraging ecology, such as cooperation, sex equality
and egalitarianism. These themes are present in narratives from other foraging societies. We
also show that the presence of good storytellers is associated with increased cooperation. In
return, skilled storytellers are preferred social partners and have greater reproductive suc-
cess, providing a pathway by which group-beneﬁcial behaviours, such as storytelling, can
evolve via individual-level selection. We conclude that one of the adaptive functions of
storytelling among hunter gatherers may be to organise cooperation.
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Cooperation is a central problem in biology
1, 2. This is
especially true in humans given the range of extensive
cooperation observed, including food sharing3, 4, allocare5,
6 and political coalitions7. Adaptive explanations for cooperation
—broadly deﬁned as a behaviour which evolved to beneﬁt others8
—often focus on the ‘free-rider problem’; that is, explaining how
a behaviour which decreases ﬁtness (at least in the short-term)
can be evolutionarily advantageous. Many solutions to this pro-
blem have been proposed, such as kin selection9, reciprocal
cooperation10, costly signalling11 and indirect reciprocity12,
among others. However, even in situations where cooperation
would be the best strategy for all involved, cooperation may not
occur due to ‘problems of coordination’. Under these circum-
stances, cooperation is not hindered by the potential for free-
riding, but rather by a lack of common knowledge over the
behaviour of others13, 14. Meta-knowledge is therefore required to
solve these problems of coordination. In other words, it is not
enough to know how to act in a given situation; individuals need
to know that others also know how to act. While language is
undoubtedly essential as a medium of communication for coor-
dination15, here we propose that storytelling in particular may
have played an essential role in the evolution of human coop-
eration by broadcasting social and cooperative norms to coordi-
nate group behaviour (see also refs. 16, 17).
Storytelling is a human universal18 which occurs spontaneously
in childhood19, while cross-cultural phylogenetic analyses have
shown that folk stories may be highly conserved20. The universal
presence and antiquity of storytelling indicates that it may be an
important human adaptation21–24. Hunter-gatherer societies have
strong oral storytelling traditions dictating social behaviour
regarding marriage, interactions with in-laws, food sharing,
hunting norms and taboos25–27. These stories appear to coordi-
nate group behaviour and facilitate cooperation by providing
individuals with social information about the norms, rules and
expectations in a given society15, 28, 29. It has recently been argued
that religion with high-gods is a form of ﬁctional story that helped
in the expansion of large-scale human cooperation30. However,
moralistic high-gods cannot be the original form of norm-
enforcing ﬁction in human societies, as phylogenetic recon-
structions suggest that they only emerged after increased political
complexity associated with agricultural expansion31. Further-
more, hunter-gatherers display widespread cooperation (such as
camp-wide food sharing, rituals for conﬂict resolution and long-
term cooperation with unrelated individuals), and, despite being
inveterate storytellers25, 29, mostly lack the belief in moralistic
high-gods32. Although others have proposed that storytelling was
an important step in human evolution16, 21–24, this hypothesis
remains largely untested using real-world empirical data. For
these reasons, we decided to analyse the content and functions of
storytelling in a hunter-gatherer population (the Agta).
Here we show that: (i) Agta stories convey messages of coop-
eration, sex equality and social egalitarianism; (ii) stories from
other hunter-gatherer societies also appear designed to coordinate
social behaviour and promote cooperation; (iii) individuals from
camps with a greater proportion of skilled storytellers are more
cooperative; (iv) skilled storytellers are preferred social partners
Table 1 Agta stories
Story Plot Promoted social norms Mechanism
The sun and the
moon
There is a dispute between the sun (male) and the moon
(female) to illuminate the sky. After a ﬁght, where the moon
proves to be as strong as the sun, they agree in sharing the
duty —one during the day and the other during the night.
Sex equality, cooperation
between the sexes
Calculation and comparison of
payoffs to cooperation vs.
competition
The wild pig and
the seacow
Wild pig and seacow were best friends and always raced each
other for fun. But the seacow injured his legs and could not
run anymore. The wild pig was unhappy and carried the
seacow to the sea. They could race each other again, pig on
land and seacow in the sea.
Friendship, cooperation Advantageous inequality aversion
The monkey and
the giant
The monkey and his other animal friends would like to camp
close to the river. However, there was a giant there who
would attack whoever went close to the river. They went
anyway, and had to take turns to look after the camping site
during the night. The giant came and said to the monkey he
was going to eat them. Together they plot a defence plan
against the giant: the monkey tricked the giant into a cave
where they had hidden bee and ant nests. The giant died. The
monkey was the leader of the plan. His friends congratulated
him, but reminded him that even though he was the smartest
animal in the forest, he was still vulnerable, as the monkey-
eating eagle could take him.
Cooperation, social equality Reverse dominance hierarchy
The winged ant An ant who had wings lived together with other ants. One day
she said to herself: ʻI am not their friends because they don’t
have wingsʼ. She went to bird and said, ʻYou must be my
friend because you have wings.’ Bird said, ʻNo you are an ant
and I am a birdʼ. Then she went to the wasp, mosquito and
butterﬂy and they all said the same. Then she went back to an
ant and said, ʻYou must be my friend even though you don’t
have wings.’ The Ant said, ʻYes you are an ant and I am an
ant’. So all the ants welcomed her and said, ʻAnt with wings,
you are our queen’.
Social equality, group
cohesion
Social acceptance, group identity
The table shows four Agta stories, the main plot, promoted social norms and proposed mechanisms for norm compliance found in these stories
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and more likely to be cooperated with and (v) skilled storytellers
possess greater reproductive success. We conclude that story-
telling may perform an adaptive function by organising coop-
erative systems in hunter-gatherer societies. These results also
provide a pathway by which group-beneﬁcial behaviours, such as
storytelling, can evolve via individual-level selection.
Results
Hunter-gatherer stories coordinate social behaviour. We col-
lected stories in a community of Agta in Palanan, the Philippines.
We asked three elders to tell us stories they normally tell children
and each other. The elders told us four stories over three nights
(Table 1). All stories featured humanised natural entities such as
animals or celestial bodies, but no Agta. All stories conveyed
norms and principles regulating cooperation and social beha-
viour, speciﬁcally sex equality (‘The sun and the moon’), social
egalitarianism and friendship (‘The wild pig and the seacow’),
group cooperation (‘The monkey and the giant’) and group
identity and social acceptance (‘The winged ant’). In these stories
the ending reﬂects a reconciliation of individual interests and
differences, while also exemplifying various mechanisms of social
norm enforcement, such as emphasising the beneﬁts to coop-
eration over competition, examples of punishment for breaking
norms, and reverse dominance hierarchies to prevent individual
accumulation of power16, 33. These topics are recurrent in stories
from other hunter-gatherer groups (Supplementary Table 1). To
explore the content of hunter-gatherer stories in greater detail we
collected 89 stories over seven different forager societies and
coded them according to subject matter (see Methods for further
details). Of these stories, around 70% were classiﬁed as pertaining
to ‘social behaviour’ (i.e. prescribing social norms or coordinating
behavioural expectations), more than any other category (Sup-
plementary Table 2). Therefore, storytelling in general may pro-
vide a mechanism to coordinate behaviour and expectations,
transmit social information and promote cooperation in hunter-
gatherer camps.
Storytelling is associated with camp-level cooperation. Con-
ﬁrming this expectation, we found that camps with a greater
proportion of skilled storytellers were associated with increased
levels of cooperation. We measured individual reputations for
storytelling by asking people (n = 297, over 18 camps in two
municipalities) to name the best storytellers in camp (we imposed
no lower or upper limit on the number of nominations; see
‘Methods’). For each camp, the average proportion of nomina-
tions received by each individual was used as a proxy for camp-
level storytelling skill. We also asked 290 Agta adults from these
camps to play an experimental resource allocation game in which
subjects could either keep or share any desired fraction of a
resource34. A multi-level linear regression model controlling for
camp size, average camp relatedness and municipality showed
that a greater proportion of individuals nominated as storytellers
in a camp was signiﬁcantly associated with increased coopera-
tiveness (b = −215.6, 95% CI: [−47.8; −383.4], p = 0.012: Fig. 1,
Supplementary Table 3). The regression coefﬁcient implies that a
1% increase in nominations of good storytellers was associated
with an increase in donations by 2.2 percentage points. This
association is consistent with skilled storytellers spreading coop-
erative norms and promoting cooperation in camps. However,
this association may have alternative explanations and result from
other social processes. For example, more cooperative camps may
tell a greater number of stories, perhaps because they are more
socially cohesive (although in Supplementary Table 4 we
demonstrate that this result is unlikely to be an artefact of camp-
mate familiarity, as these ﬁndings hold when controlling for the
frequency of repeated interactions in a sub-set of camps).
Therefore, if storytelling plays a functional role in promoting
cooperation, we predict that skilled storytellers would be pre-
ferred as social partners. In contrast, if storytelling is only a
consequence or by-product of cooperation, preferred social
partners are likely to be chosen on the basis of other character-
istics, such as foraging skill or medicinal knowledge.
Skilled storytellers are preferred social partners. Since living in
a more cooperative camp brings beneﬁts at individual levels (even
for non-cooperators), we tested whether people would prefer to
live in camps with more skilled storytellers, where norms of
cooperation are more likely to be spread. To assess storytelling
reputation, for each camp the number of nominations received by
each individual was converted into z-scores and transformed into
a binary response variable (‘skilled’ vs. ‘non-skilled’ storyteller; see
‘Methods’). We asked 291 Agta across the 18 camps to choose
who they would most like to live with (with a maximum of ﬁve
nominations), obtaining 857 nominations out of a possible 6534
dyads (all of which were within-camp nominations). We ran a
logistic generalised estimation equation (GEE) regression to
predict the probability of being picked as a future camp mate
from the measure of individual storytelling reputation. We found
that skilled storytellers were nearly twice as likely to be nominated
as less skilled individuals (Table 2, model 1). This pattern holds
after controlling for kinship, reciprocal nominations, distance, as
well as age and sex variables (Table 2, model 2). In addition to
storytelling, other reputational measures were assessed, including
skill in hunting, ﬁshing, tuber gathering, medicinal knowledge
and camp inﬂuence (Methods). Including these factors in the
model (Table 2, model 3) indicated that storytelling was the most
important reputational attribute, with skilled storytellers again
having roughly double the odds of being nominated relative to
non-skilled storytellers (OR = 1.95), an effect much larger than
that of possessing a good ﬁshing reputation, the second-best
reputational predictor (OR = 1.5). Removal of all non-signiﬁcant
variables does not alter these ﬁndings (Supplementary Table 5).
The effect size of storytelling ability was approximately the same
magnitude as selecting primary kin (PK) and reciprocal partners.
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Fig. 1 Association between cooperation and storytellers in camp. Results of
the multi-level linear regression model, indicating an association between
the average proportion of nominations for being a skilled storyteller in each
camp and the amount given to others in the resource allocation game (b=
−215.6, 95% CI: [−47.8; −383.4], p= 0.012). To facilitate interpretation, a
higher value on the y-axis indicates a greater proportion of resources given
to others (i.e. more cooperation). Residual values control for average camp
relatedness, camp size and municipality (n= 290, camps= 18). For
coefﬁcients of the full model see Supplementary Table 3. Black points: camp
averages; grey points: individual data points
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These results demonstrate that the Agta prefer to live in camps
with skilled storytellers, who are even more valued than good
foragers, which may reﬂect the importance of storytellers in
promoting cooperation and bringing gains to all individuals in a
camp (although storytellers may also be favoured for dis-
seminating other ﬁtness-relevant information as well, such as
foraging, survival and geography16, 26, 35, 36). Although these
results point to a group-level advantage of storytelling, they do
not indicate what would be the individual beneﬁt for storytellers
(although see ref. 24). In other words, they do not explain why
individuals would invest in acquiring a costly skill with no
apparent individual ﬁtness beneﬁts compared to other skills such
as hunting, gathering or ﬁshing.
Skilled storytellers have higher reproductive success. Story-
telling is a costly behaviour requiring an input of time and energy
into practice, performance and cognitive processing37, 38. Indeed,
several ethnographic sources highlight the theatrical and active
nature often associated with storytelling performances27, 29. In
addition, the group-level beneﬁts of storytelling are susceptible to
free-riders, who could reap the beneﬁts of storytelling without
paying the costs1. Thus, all else being equal non-storytellers
should have higher ﬁtness, unless storytelling brings direct ﬁtness
beneﬁts to skilled storytellers. We therefore investigated repro-
ductive success as a function of storytelling skill among the Agta.
We ran a mixed-effects linear regression of number of living
offspring on storytelling ability (controlling for age, sex and
camp: Supplementary Table 6). The results show that skilled
storytellers had an additional 0.53 living offspring compared to
non-skilled storytellers (b = 0.53, 95% CI: [0.10; 0.96], n = 324, p
= 0.016), indicating that storytelling skill is associated with
increased ﬁtness (Fig. 2). Both camp-mate nomination and ﬁtness
results are robust to manipulations, such as using continuous,
rather than binary, assessments of storytelling ability, and
quantifying storytelling ability separately for each sex (due to the
potential for female Agta to be over-represented as skilled
storytellers: see ‘Methods’ & Supplementary Tables 6–9).
It is possible that by performing an important social function
skilled storytellers receive increased social support from others39,
which has been associated with increased ﬁtness among
numerous primate species40, consistent with the fact that they
are preferred social partners. Supporting this interpretation, we
also demonstrate that skilled storytellers are more likely to be
recipients of resource transfers in the experimental game
(Supplementary Tables 10 and 11). This suggests that storytellers
may be ‘rewarded’ for their public good by other camp mates who
beneﬁt from the increased cooperation which storytellers may
promote, in what may be mutually beneﬁcial trade-like relation-
ships (although the individual-level beneﬁts to those who
cooperate with storytellers remain in need of further empirical
study). People might also enjoy listening to stories for other
reasons, such as a form of ‘mental simulation’ to learn about their
social and physical environment24, 41–47, and be paying for the
service (this effect could be independent from the function of
storytelling in promoting cooperation).
Discussion
We conclude that storytelling may perform an important adap-
tive function in hunter-gatherer societies by organising coop-
erative systems, serving the function of ‘broadcasting’ cooperative
norms. Storytelling among the Agta and other hunter-gatherers
conveys strong messages of cooperation, sex and social equality,
and inequality aversion, and are widely told in camps to adults
and children25. These stories appear to promote cooperation
within a camp, as the proportion of skilled storytellers is posi-
tively associated with measures of camp-level cooperation. Fur-
thermore, people show a strong preference to live with good
storytellers, even more so than with good foragers, despite the fact
that Agta society is characterised by extensive food sharing4. By
introducing individuals to situations beyond their everyday
experience, narratives may also increase empathy and perspective
taking towards others, including strangers48–50 (although see ref.
51), potentially facilitating camp-level coordination and coop-
eration. The value of good storytellers is reﬂected in the fact that
they also have increased reproductive success and receive more
resources than less-skilled storytellers. We therefore provide a
pathway by which storytelling, a group-beneﬁcial behaviour, can
evolve via individual-level selection (however, further research is
necessary to understand the individual-level beneﬁts of camp-
mates cooperating with storytellers). Although narratives are
known to serve other adaptive functions, such as disseminating
information on survival, foraging and the environment16, 26, 35, 36,
Table 2 Storytelling ability and camp-mate decisions
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log-odds estimate Odds ratio Log-odds estimate Odds ratio Log-odds estimate Odds ratio
Storytelling reputation 0.56 [0.4; 0.72]*** 1.75 0.78 [0.58; 0.98]*** 2.17 0.67 [0.47; 0.87]*** 1.95
Primary kin (ref. non-kin) — — 0.74 [0.35; 1.13]*** 2.09 0.7 [0.31; 1.09]*** 2.02
Distant kin (ref. non-kin) — — 0.59 [0.3; 0.88]*** 1.81 0.57 [0.28; 0.86]*** 1.77
Spouse’s primary kin/primary kin’s spouse
(ref. non-kin)
— — 0.59 [0.24; 0.94]*** 1.81 0.57 [0.22; 0.92]** 1.77
Spouse’s distant kin/other afﬁnes
(ref. non-kin)
— — 0.25 [0; 0.5]* 1.29 0.24 [−0.01; 0.49]˙ 1.27
Spouse (ref. non-kin) — — −0.25 [−0.98; 0.48] 0.78 −0.28 [−1.02; 0.46] 0.76
Reciprocity — — 0.66 [0.46; 0.86]*** 1.93 0.67 [0.47; 0.87]*** 1.95
Fishing reputation — — — — 0.4 [0.13; 0.67]** 1.5
Hunting reputation — — — — 0.24 [−0.03; 0.51]˙ 1.27
Tuber gathering reputation — — — — 0.27 [0; 0.54]˙ 1.31
Medicinal knowledge reputation — — — — 0.12 [−0.12; 0.36] 1.12
Camp inﬂuence reputation — — — — 0.23 [−0.02; 0.48]˙ 1.26
Intercept −0.88 [−0.68; −1.08]*** 0.92 [0.35; 1.49]** 0.97 [0.38; 1.56]**
Distance, age, and sex controls No Yes Yes
Models assessing the likelihood of skilled storytellers being selected in a ‘camp-mate’ network, using a logistic GEE regression (n= 291, dyads= 6534). All models contain camp size as a control variable
(not displayed). 95% conﬁdence intervals are displayed in brackets. ˙P<0.1, *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-02036-8
4 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 8:  1853 |DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-02036-8 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications
or simply to entertain and hold the audience’s attention23, we
provide evidence that storytelling may have also been an
important factor in facilitating widespread human cooperation. It
is therefore possible that cooperation and storytelling co-evolved
via a process of mutual reinforcement.
The evidence provided here is consistent with the theory that
storytelling acts as a mechanism to coordinate group behaviour
and promote cooperation. However, these ﬁndings are largely
correlational and further studies are required to conclusively
demonstrate that storytelling performs a causal role in facilitating
cooperative behaviour. One potential option would be to conduct
longitudinal work to explore if patterns of camp-level cooperation
vary with changes in camp composition, explicitly regarding the
addition or loss of skilled storytellers. Logistically, however, this
approach is very demanding, therefore a simpler approach to
establish causality may be to use ‘priming’ experiments, such that
those primed with a cooperative story ought to cooperate more in
a subsequent task. Similar studies have previously been conducted
(although not explicitly regarding storytelling), suggesting that
individuals in experimental games are more cooperative if they
can communicate and therefore coordinate their behaviour15, 52,
consistent with the mechanism proposed here. Additionally,
although we demonstrate an association between the presence of
skilled storytellers in camp and levels of cooperation, future
studies may beneﬁt from utilising more direct indices of story-
telling, such as the amount of storytelling in a camp, to assess this
putative link in greater detail.
Humans have evolved the cognitive ability to create and believe
in stories. We propose that those features evolved in hunter-
gatherer societies as precursors to more elaborate forms of nar-
rative ﬁction, such as moralising high-gods. In hunter-gatherer
societies, which are highly egalitarian53, 54 and cooperative4, 55, 56,
but where organised religion and moralising high-gods are
commonly absent32, storytelling appears to promote cooperation,
spread cooperative norms57 and represent punishment of norm-
breakers. In sum, we argue that storytelling may perform an
adaptive function by organising cooperation in hunter-gatherers,
preceding the emergence of more complex ﬁctions such as all-
knowing and punitive high-gods associated with the expansion of
large-scale cooperation in human societies only after the origin of
farming30. From simple storytelling to complex religion, and later
formal institutions such as nation states, the evolution of story-
telling may have been pivotal in organising and promoting
human cooperation.
Methods
Ethnographic background. The Agta are an indigenous Filipino population,
believed to be descendants of the ﬁrst colonisers of the Philippines over 35,000
years ago58, and are distinguishable from their non-Agta neighbours by their short
‘pygmy’ physique, dark skin, tight curly hair and predominantly foraging mode of
subsistence. The Agta in the study population are from the Northern Sierra Madre
Natural Park in Isabela Province, north-east Luzon, a remote area of protected
forest land accessible only by plane, boat, or a three-day hike. Speciﬁcally, the study
focuses on two sub-populations, the Palanan Agta, who number around 1,000
individuals, and the Maconacon Agta, who number around 250 individuals. These
sub-populations live ∼50 km apart and are largely separate, with few genealogical
links between the two. Both sub-populations live on or near river-banks or coastal
areas, and predominantly engage in foraging activities, particularly ﬁshing, but also
hunting, collecting honey, and gathering wild plants, which they either consume or
trade for rice with the local agricultural non-Agta population. Depending on
availability, some Agta also participate in wage labour (often clearing land for non-
Agta farmers) or assist in rice harvesting, where they often receive a share of the
harvest. Camp sizes vary between solitary dwellings (7 individuals) and large camps
of up to 26 houses (156 individuals), with an average of 7 houses (49 individuals).
Although many Agta nominally classify themselves as Christian (of various
denominations), few Agta regularly attend church or possess much knowledge
about Christianity. A few camps are more integrated with organised religion,
particularly due to Born Again Christian Missionaries, where traditional beliefs in
‘bad spirits’ (anitos) are combined with Christianity. In traditional Agta cosmology
there are no moralising or punishing high-gods. Initial demographic ﬁeldwork was
conducted between April and June 2013, with further ﬁeldwork conducted between
February and October 2014.
Storytelling deﬁnition. ‘Storytelling’ is deﬁned loosely here to encompass a
spectrum of narrative forms, from ‘ritualised’ storytelling, often in larger groups
and accompanied by cosmological or religious content, to less-structured story-
telling as a part of everyday conversation among smaller groups. Cutting across
these contextual differences, a story can be broadly deﬁned as ʻan account of a
sequence of events in the order in which they occurred to make a point’59. A story
can also be deﬁned by its components, and several lines of evidence have converged
from literary theory and cognitive psychology which suggest that narratives consist
of: character, setting, events, causal connections and resolution (for a review see ref.
24). These are inclusive deﬁnitions of ‘storytelling’, which encompass both ritua-
lised or ﬁctional stories, as well as many aspects of everyday conversation which
also contain non-ﬁctional narratives, such as jokes, anecdotes or details of previous
experiences. Although much research focuses on ﬁctional stories29, the importance
of non-ﬁctional narratives should not be overlooked. For instance, in her work with
the Ju/’hoansi, Wiessner25 provides details of several stories, all of which are non-
ﬁctional, which broadcast social norms concerning issues such as sex, marriage,
sharing obligations and norm-breakers (see also Supplementary Table 1 for other
examples of non-ﬁctional stories, such as by the Batak).
Assessing storytelling reputation. To assess storytelling reputation, 297 Agta
over 18 camps (mean age = 37, range = 16–70, males = 142) were asked to name the
best storytellers in camp (there was no limit on the number of names individuals
could select). From this, storytelling ability was calculated for 324 Agta. To permit
comparisons between camps of different sizes the number of nominations for each
individual were converted into z-scores for each camp separately (calculated by
subtracting the camp mean from the individual score, then dividing this by the
camp standard deviation). Due to a heavily-skewed distribution (lots of poor, but
few good, storytellers; Supplementary Fig. 1), these were converted into a binary
variable, with skilled storytellers being those above the mean for their camp (i.e. a
positive z-score). From this, 199 Agta were classiﬁed as ‘unskilled’ storytellers
(males = 109), while 125 were categorised as ‘skilled’ (males = 51). The average
relatedness of individuals to camp-mates, relative to the overall camp relatedness,
was no different between skilled and unskilled storytellers (mean relatedness
relative to overall camp relatedness for skilled storytellers = 0.001, SE = 0.005, mean
relatedness relative to overall camp relatedness for unskilled storytellers = −0.001,
SE = 0.004; t = −0.229, n = 324, p = 0.819), suggesting that nominations for story-
tellers were unaffected by relatedness.
One potential issue with this methodology is that it focuses on within-camp
comparisons of storytelling ability, such that storytelling skill may be relative to
each camp, rather than absolute for the population, which may hinder between-
camp comparisons. However, this is unlikely to have occurred as the average
proportion of nominations for each individual per camp ranged from 0.03 to 0.21
(see ‘Resource Allocation Game’ section below), indicative of substantial between-
camp variation in the number of nominations for storytelling ability. Additionally,
the proportion of individuals who nominated no-one varied considerably between
camps (from 0% to 62.5%). A χ2 test of independence reported that the frequency
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Fig. 2 Reproductive success and storytelling ability. Results of the mixed-
effects linear regression model, indicating that reproductive success, based
on number of living offspring, was greater in skilled storytellers (n= 125)
relative to less-skilled storytellers (n= 199; b= 0.53, 95% CI: [0.10; 0.96],
p= 0.016). Residuals control for age, age-squared, sex and camp. Error bars
represent 95% conﬁdence intervals
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of individuals nominating no-one varied signiﬁcantly between camps (χ2(17,
n = 297) = 82.28, p< 0.001). Together, these suggest that storyteller nominations
were not simply relative to camp-mates, but rather reﬂect absolute differences in
skill.
In a logistic regression containing age and sex, older individuals possessed a
greater storytelling reputation (b = 0.04, 95% CI: [0.02; 0.06], n = 324, p< 0.001).
An interaction was also found between age and sex (Supplementary Fig. 2), with
storytelling ability increasing more with age for men than for woman (b = 0.04,
95% CI: [0.01; 0.08], n = 324, p = 0.033). Women were also more likely to be skilled
storytellers than men (b = −0.76 (ref. female), 95% CI: [−0.27; −1.25], n = 324,
p = 0.002). While both sexes selected an equivalent proportion of same-sex
individuals as skilled storytellers (female mean = 0.73, male mean = 0.69, Mann
Whitney U = 6,162, n = 297, p = 0.38), females nominated a greater number of
individuals overall (female mean = 1.97, male mean = 1.47, Mann Whitney
U = 8,760, n = 297, p = 0.004), which may explain why women were over-
represented as skilled storytellers relative to men. If z-scores for storytellers are
calculated separately for each sex to control for the bias of females nominating
other females, we ﬁnd that the effect of sex on storytelling skill is largely attenuated,
but still approaches signiﬁcance in the direction of more skilled female storytellers
(b = −0.42, 95% CI: [0.05; −0.89], n = 324, p = 0.083). The effect of age is still
strongly signiﬁcant (b = 0.04, 95% CI: [0.02; 0.06], n = 324, p< 0.001), while a
signiﬁcant interaction between age and sex is again reported if this is included in
the model (b = 0.04, 95% CI: [0.00; 0.08], n = 324, p = 0.04).
In addition to assessing storytelling reputation, these 297 individuals were also
asked to nominate the best hunters, ﬁshers, tuber-gatherers, and those with the
most medicinal knowledge. Camp inﬂuence was also assessed, but in a slightly
different way, by asking ʻif there is a discussion in camp, whose opinions are
listened to the most? Who is malakas (strong)?’ Individual z-scores were again
constructed for individuals in each camp in these domains. Although there were no
restrictions against naming females as hunters or ﬁshers, or males as tuber-
gatherers, these were very rare, so all instances were removed prior to analysis and
z-scores for these domains were only constructed for the relevant sex (hunting and
ﬁshing for males, tuber gathering for females). To allow all prestige measures across
all individuals to be compared in the same model, all women were assigned a ‘0’ for
hunting and ﬁshing, while all men were given a ‘0’ for tuber gathering. Although
including sex as a co-variate in analyses should control for these sex-speciﬁc
foraging domains, to remove this potential confound we constructed an additional
‘overall foraging skill’ variable combining both male and female foraging activities
(using average number of hunting and ﬁshing nominations for male foraging skill,
tuber-gathering nominations for female foraging skill, then merging the two).
Using this new variable, we ﬁnd no qualitative difference in our main ﬁndings
regarding who individuals chose as camp-mates or as recipients of cooperation
(Supplementary Table 12), with storytellers still selected more frequently than
skilled foragers.
Although there is some correlation between different reputational domains
(Supplementary Table 13), these are generally weak (r< 0.3). Collinearity
diagnostics cannot be conducted for GEE analyses, but a similar approach
employing multiple regression using aggregate popularity for each individual
(z-scores based on the number of nominations for each individual, calculating each
camp separately) indicated that collinearity between these reputational domains is
weak (all ‘variance inﬂation factors’ (VIFs) <1.5; a VIF greater than ‘3’ is indicative
of severe collinearity), and is therefore unlikely to bias these results.
Although it is difﬁcult to validate all our reputational measures against actual
behaviour, it was possible to assess a small sample of ﬁshers from one particularly
well-studied camp for which enough foraging trips were recorded to permit
comparisons between individuals. In this camp, perceived skill in ﬁshing was
signiﬁcantly correlated with both ﬁshing returns per hour (r = 0.606, n = 16,
p = 0.013) and total calories obtained from ﬁshing (r = 0.802, n = 16, p< 0.001),
indicating that these nominations likely reﬂect a combination of both effort and
skill, and are therefore valid and can be used as a proxy for skill level. Further
verifying this methodology, comparable protocols on Hadza hunting skill indicated
a similar proﬁle, with those perceived as possessing greater hunting skill having
greater overall return rates and returns per hour60. Many of the Agta rated by
others as skilled storytellers were also those who were the most engaging and
knowledgeable during our ﬁeldwork. These reputational measures therefore appear
to reﬂect real-world dynamics among the Agta.
Resource allocation game. A simple resource allocation game was played with
290 Agta (mean age = 37, range = 16–70, males = 140) across these 18 camps to
assess levels of cooperation. Only camps with eight or more adult members present
were included in the games for the statistical analysis to possess an adequate sample
size. Due to the majority of Agta not knowing their exact ages, adults were deﬁned
as either married or divorced individuals, or those believed to be over the age of
~16. Approximately ten days were spent at each Agta camp. Games were only
played on the last few days in order to maximise familiarity with the researchers
and facilitate trust, but also to minimise the potential for collusion between camp-
mates. We do not believe that this occurred, as there were no sudden shifts in game
behaviour over time. Prior to playing the game in each camp, photographs of all
players were taken and Polaroids printed.
In private, participants were shown their own picture, along with all other
camp-mates (up to a maximum of 10). Thus, in camps with 12 or more members,
10 randomly selected camp-mates (in addition to ego) were chosen. The decision to
randomly-select 10 individuals from larger camps, rather than include all
individuals, was chosen for practical and comparative reasons. Firstly, including all
camp-mates from larger camps would have been logistically unfeasible as the
amount of rice needed would increase exponentially with camp size. Secondly,
although it would have been possible to limit the amount of rice by including all
individuals in a large camp and only using ten tokens, this would make
comparisons between larger and smaller camps difﬁcult as otherwise the ratio of
equal tokens to potential recipients would be violated in larger camps.
A number of tokens equal to the number of camp-mate pictures were then
given to the participant, each of which represented one-eighth of a kilo of rice (125
g; approximately a meal for one individual). Participants were then asked, for each
token, whether they would like to keep the rice for themselves, or give it to a camp-
mate, and if so, to whom. After each iteration, tokens were placed on the respective
individual. This was repeated until there were no tokens remaining. Only the
participant, experimenter, and translator were aware of an individual’s decisions.
Individuals were briefed on the games in their local language, and assured that all
decisions would remain secret from other camp-mates. They were told that there
were no correct answers, and that they, and whoever they gave rice to, would be
given it before the researchers left camp. After ﬁnishing the game, participants were
thanked and asked politely not to tell anyone else about how they played. In total,
the procedure took about 10–15 min per participant. Prior to leaving camp, the
amount of rice earned by each participant was given to them (the amount they
received from others and the amount they kept for themselves), along with
remuneration for their time and assistance in other aspects of the project
conducted simultaneously.
This non-anonymous game structure was used in order for both levels of
cooperative behaviour and patterns of cooperation (i.e. who individuals share with,
such as kin, reciprocal partners or storytellers) to be ascertained. The game is
similar to the ‘Gift Game’ conducted in several populations56, 61–63 where
participants are given resources (e.g. sticks of honey) and have to decide who to
give it to. Although the game used here is structurally alike, it possesses the added
rule that participants could either keep a share for themselves if they wished, or
give it to a camp-mate of their choosing. Although the Gift Game allows the choice
of giving to multiple individuals, it does not measure levels of cooperation as there
is no option for keeping gifts for one’s self, and is therefore not a social dilemma64
as there is no conﬂict between individual and group interests. On the other hand,
although traditional economic games, such as the Ultimatum Game, Dictator
Game, and Public Goods Game65, are social dilemmas, they include only
anonymous partners, and therefore ignore the role that differences in relationship
have on cooperation66 and cannot be used to explore who individuals preferentially
share resources with.
After preliminary trials with different resources, it was decided that rice would
be used as the game resource as it is highly sought-after by the Agta and therefore
carries enough value to cause a dilemma when deciding whether to share or not.
Initial trials with other goods, such as honey sticks, were perceived to have little
value (and were freely distributed to children). After discussing with the Agta
which resources were most valued, rice was the unanimous choice. The Agta do not
grow their own rice (although they may harvest it for neighbouring agricultural
populations), and although it is a non-foraged commodity introduced by non-Agta
agricultural populations it is one of the Agta’s primary sources of calories (when
available) and is highly valued. The vast majority of meals are consumed with rice,
and in some cases consist solely of rice.
The percentage of tokens kept for self was used as the dependent variable in this
analysis, with a higher percentage meaning more rice kept for self and less given to
others. This ranged from 0% to 100%, with a mean of 62.6%. Multi-level models
were used to control for the non-independence of data points within camps67. The
independent variable of interest was the average proportion of skilled storyteller
nominations per individual for each camp, which ranged from 0.03 to 0.21, with a
mean of 0.1. Proportion of nominations, rather than number of nominations, was
used in this analysis to control for differences in camp size. For instance, in a camp
of 10 individuals, if on average each camp-mate receives two nominations, the
average proportion of nominations would be 0.2 per person. In contrast, for a camp
of 20 individuals, an average of two nominations per individual only corresponds
to an average proportion of nominations of 0.1 per person. Individuals from the
ﬁrst camp were therefore proportionally more likely to be nominated than
individuals from the second group, suggesting that the ﬁrst camp contains better
storytellers. As group size68 and relatedness9 may inﬂuence cooperation, these were
both included as ﬁxed effects to control for these potential confounds. Municipality
was also included as a dummy ﬁxed effect to control for differences in cooperation
between Palanan and Maconacon. An additional analysis was conducted with a
sub-set of 11 camps from Palanan for which data on the frequency of repeated
interactions were available to explore whether storytelling skill was confounded
with camp-mate familiarity (Supplementary Table 4).
Camp-mate and resource distribution network analyses. To assess social ties,
291 Agta (mean age = 37.3 range = 16–70, males = 138) were asked to name the ﬁve
individuals they would most like to live with (similar to the ‘camp-mate network’
conducted with the Hadza61). This was conducted in a separate interview to the
reputational questions in an attempt to forestall cross-over effects. Once nomi-
nations for non-Agta, non-camp-mates, and other camp-mates who did not take
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part in the camp-mate network were removed, a total of 857 nominations remained
from a possible 6534 dyads. Logistic GEE regression methods were used to control
for multiple nominations by the same individual69.
For the response variable, a matrix was constructed containing a ‘1’ if ego
selected alter to live with or a ‘0’ if not. Between-camp dyads were coded as
missing. The main independent variable of interest was storytelling reputation, as
deﬁned above, with skilled storytellers coded as ‘1’ and unskilled storytellers as ‘0’.
Other predictor variables included: kinship, reciprocity (if alter chose to live with
ego), distance, as well as age (of ego, alter, and age gap between ego and alter) and
sex (of ego, alter, and whether ego and alter were of the same or different sex). Kin
relationships were deﬁned as: PK, with a relatedness coefﬁcient of r = 0.5 to ego;
distant kin (DK), with a relatedness coefﬁcient between r = 0.25 to r = 0.03125
(second cousins) to ego; spouse; spouse’s primary kin/primary kin’s spouse
(SPK/PKS); spouse’s distant kin/other afﬁnes (SDK/OA), which includes DK of
spouse or other afﬁnal relationships up to ﬁve steps away from ego (e.g. spouse’s
brother’s wife’s mother (four steps away)); and non-relatives (NR), which includes
everyone else without a kinship link to ego (for further details see ref. 53). As these
are categorical variables, each of these kinship categories were compared against
the probability of selecting to live with non-kin. The matrix for reciprocity was the
transpose of the response variable (i.e. whether alter chose to live with ego).
Distance was coded from one to four, reﬂecting increasing distance between ego
and alter, with categories of; living in the same house as ego (1), living in the house
next to ego (2), having a house between ego’s and alter’s (3) and living further away
(4). The relationship between nominating an individual in the camp-mate network
and other reputational domains (hunting, ﬁshing, etc.) were also assessed. Camp
size was included as a control in all models to control for larger camps possessing a
greater number of potential recipients to nominate.
The resource allocation network employed an identical logistic GEE regression
approach using the same methodology and variables as described above, but here
using nominations of who individuals distributed resources to in the resource
allocation game (n = 290, dyads = 1312). In this analysis the proportion of resources
kept for self was used as a control variable to ensure that patterns of resource
distributions were not confounded with overall levels of cooperation.
Reproductive success analysis. Number of living offspring was used as a proxy
for reproductive success. This was ascertained by obtaining reproductive histories
of all individuals during genealogical interviews. Both age and age-squared were
included in the model to control for differences in age-speciﬁc fertility. As hus-
bands are generally older than their wives among the Agta, this may result in lower
estimates of age-speciﬁc reproductive success for men, so sex was also included as a
control. Fertility, mortality and reproductive success among the Agta also vary
depending on the camp70, so multi-level modelling was used to control for camp-
level variation in reproductive success. When included, the interaction between
storytelling skill and sex is non-signiﬁcant (b = 0.61, CI: [−0.25; 1.47], n = 324,
p = 0.17), suggesting that reproductive beneﬁts of being a skilled storyteller may
accrue to both sexes.
Robustness checks. In this section we demonstrate that these results of story-
tellers possessing an increased number of camp-mate nominations as well as higher
ﬁtness are not a statistical artefact, as we replicate results now using storytelling as a
continuous variable (rather than binary), and controlling for female-biased
nominations of storytellers by quantifying storytelling skill separately for each sex
(both as a binary and continuous variable; see ‘Assessing storytelling reputation’
section of Methods above). The results for ﬁtness outcomes (Supplementary
Table 6) and camp-mate nominations (Supplementary Tables 7–9) are qualitatively
identical to those presented in the main text, with skilled storytellers both pos-
sessing greater reproductive success and more likely to be nominated in a camp-
mate network. For camp-mate models using continuous, rather than binary,
measures of reputations, z-scores for sex-speciﬁc domains (hunting, ﬁshing and
tuber gathering) were constructed using data from both sexes.
Stories from other hunter-gatherer societies. We conducted a literature search
in order to compare the content of Agta stories against those from other Southeast
Asian hunter-gatherer societies. This included other hunter-gatherer groups such
as the Andamanese, the Batek (from peninsula Malaysia), the Maniq (from
Thailand), and other populations from the Philippines (the Batak, Aeta and
neighbouring Agta groups; Supplementary Table 1). It is difﬁcult to obtain an
unbiased sample of stories told by hunter-gatherers as different ethnographers tend
to focus on different story contents (when investigated at all), but we speciﬁcally
selected stories that concern norms of social behaviour, such as cooperation,
relationships between the sexes and social hierarchies. Stories by the Ju/’hoansi
from southern Africa25, 29 and Central African pygmies27 were also sought out and
included in our content analysis (Supplementary Table 2), although they were not
included in Supplementary Table 1. Among the Ju/’hoansi many stories concern
marriage behaviour, in-law relationships, kinship networks and sharing norms25, as
well as sex equality and the different (but complementary) roles of each sex29, 71.
Similar trends are found among central African pygmy groups, such as the
BaYaka27, who have legends and rituals which reinforce norms of sexual egali-
tarianism and social behaviour, as well as interactions with non-BaYaka.
These stories told by hunter-gatherers appear to differ dramatically from those
of non-foraging populations. For instance, among the Bantu in southern Africa
most stories concern maintaining the status quo to preserve the leader’s
authority71, which is quite the opposite of hunter-gatherer stories which tend to
extol the virtues of egalitarianism and equality. Further supporting these
differences, in hunter-gatherers facing increased settlement and agriculture, rituals
have shifted towards practices facilitating hierarchy and sexual inequality72.
Not all stories obtained from these populations concerned social behaviour.
Many stories not described here concern cosmological content, with seemingly
little social relevance. Examples include Batek origins of the cosmos, Maniq origins
of night and day (originating from a snake continuously eating and regurgitating its
tail), and Andamanese origins of pigs (see references in Supplementary Table 1).
Their existence does not diminish the importance of stories in facilitating
cooperation, but merely highlights that stories can perform other functions, such as
disseminating ﬁtness-relevant information16, 26, 35 or just to hold the audience’s
attention23. It is also possible that these stories, regardless of content, also play a
functional role by acting as ‘ethnic markers’ which identify group membership,
again coordinating behaviour and promoting cooperation73, 74, but this is a
separate (and non-mutually exclusive) argument to that of the current paper.
In addition to the stories concerning social behaviour (Supplementary Table 1),
we also performed a content analysis of all stories collected (n = 89) from these
Southeast Asian hunter-gatherer populations in addition to two African forager
groups (Ju/’hoansi and BaYaka; Supplementary Table 2). Each story was assessed
for different types of content: social (content which prescribed and coordinated
behaviour during interactions with others, such as cooperation, sex equality, norm-
breaking, sex roles, punishment and interactions with out-groups); cosmological
(content concerning the origins of the earth/universe); natural phenomena
(content concerning navigation, animal origins/behaviour, ﬁre and natural
disasters/weather); and resource use (content about foraging and resource
extraction). Each of these broad themes are common in forager folklore16, 25, 29, 35,
75. Many stories were classiﬁed along more than one criterion, such as many
creation stories combining cosmological and social content (for instance,
see Supplementary Table 1). Some sources presented several versions of the same
basic story; to prevent unnecessary duplication, in these cases only the longest or
most elaborate stories were used in this analysis. Any analysis of this kind will of
course be subject to bias to some extent, such that others may categorise stories
differently or their ‘emic’ interpretation in the speciﬁc society may be different.
However, as social content was present in ~70% of stories, approximately double
that of the second-highest content (natural phenomena; 39%), it is unlikely that
any small changes in categorisation would greatly inﬂuence our conclusion that
one of the functions of stories in hunter-gatherer societies may be to coordinate
social behaviour.
Ethics. Ethical clearance was granted by the University College London Ethics
Committee (UCL Ethics code 3086/003). Fieldwork permission was granted by
local government units, including the Mayors of the Municipalities visited and
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as the
research took place in a protected area. Each Agta community agreed to participate
and informed consent was obtained from all individuals.
Data availability. The data that support the ﬁndings of this study are available
from the authors upon reasonable request.
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